While on vacation and trying not to dwell too much on British politics, I came across Ben Southwood’s observation from Works in Progress that the UK government’s extensive local land-use preemption far surpasses anything American YIMBY advocates have dreamed of. Yet, despite this centralization, the UK still faces a severe housing-supply crisis, underscoring the limits of centralized strategies. However, this issue may be more about British public opinion than governance structures. Polls show 71% of British citizens favor rent control, while only 47% support building new towns; among Conservative voters, nearly half prefer prioritizing social housing over homes for sale or private rent. Coupled with tight budgets restricting public housing construction, it’s unclear what institutional setup could succeed. In the U. S. , most construction happens on unincorporated land without local governments deciding; mayors tend to be more pro-housing than city council members; and at-large councils approve more housing than district-based councils. This indicates that NIMBYism strongly influences U. S. housing politics, and politicians respond differently when incentives broaden. But if the entire electorate opposed market-rate housing, no system would likely succeed. Switching to AI leadership messaging, some commentators, including Noah Smith and Geoff Shellenberger, argue AI leaders mishandle communication because they speak mainly to investors, neglecting “normal people. ” Before AI’s rise, investor and ordinary user priorities aligned closely—the lean startup ethos of “listen to users above all. ” But AI’s capital-intensive nature means the investor pool valuing such startups differs significantly now. Very few understand deep technical aspects like attention mechanisms or transformers, contributing to a bubble. Also, the limited pool of investors able to fund companies like Anthropic often have concerns far removed from those of the general public, reminiscent in some ways of Theranos’ funding by wealthy but uninformed backers. Importantly, AI executives’ bleak warnings about risks like human extinction or mass disemployment are not mere hype for investors—they sincerely believe these outcomes may occur. OpenAI’s founders held these views before releasing GPT-2; Anthropic was founded by former OpenAI staff who felt OpenAI neglected existential risks. Internal communications teams try to offer less alarming messages emphasizing AI as a productivity tool, but leaders like Sam Altman and Anthropic’s team remain aligned with the existential risk narrative. Investors grasp these messages pose political risks but understand the core team are genuine believers. They foresee AI accelerating rapidly through AI’s contribution to its own progress, potentially surpassing human intellect soon and solving robotics challenges, creating a “country of geniuses in a data center. ” For skeptical readers, Holden Karnofsky’s “Most Important Century” blog series provides a nuanced, thoughtful perspective, reflecting his sincere engagement after a career with GiveWell and Open Philanthropy. Despite messaging challenges, this is fundamentally a problem of sincere belief, not manipulation. On U. S. presidential politics, the recent dominance of senators (and a former TV host) contrasts with earlier eras when governors were more prevalent—and arguably better governors in hindsight. Current blue state governors like Gavin Newsom and JB Pritzker might not appeal to swing voters, whereas purple state governors like Josh Shapiro or Gretchen Whitmer, who have records pleasing to centrists, could be stronger nominees. Senators often occupy safe seats and cater to coalitions for career advancement rather than tackling governance challenges. Zohran Mamdani stands out among progressive politicians for holding a real job requiring trade-offs and accountability. Regarding left-wing mayors, differences in outcomes between Michelle Wu and Brandon Johnson reflect policy distinctions, council support, institutional capacity, and executive competence. Wu, though labeled progressive, has vetoed some teachers’ union measures, secured police union endorsements, avoided residential tax hikes, and sought to shift tax burdens to commercial properties, being less aggressive on zoning reform in one of America’s most under-housed metro areas. Conversely, Brandon Johnson shows closer union alignment and less independent public safety focus. Labeling politicians as “progressive” can be arbitrary. Analogously, in Los Angeles, Nithya Raman’s strong pro-housing stance contrasts with critiques about her crime approach. In D. C. , zoning reform is less urgent than in Boston or L. A. McDuffie supports extensive zoning reform, unlike LA’s Karen Bass, but Janeese Lewis George’s proposals to expand rent control and regulations risk undermining zoning efforts.

George also reflects teachers’ union influence and shares Johnson’s disregard for public safety seriousness, unlike Wu. Economic context is crucial: cities with robust global economies like New York, Boston, and San Francisco have greater political latitude for progressive ideas, while Chicago’s declining economic engine or D. C. ’s pandemic-related downturn constrain policy space. Therefore, mayors’ success often hinges on economic conditions alongside policy and political factors. Considering a historical counterfactual: If Henry Clay, leader of the Whig Party in the late 1830s, had accepted the vice-presidential nomination in 1840 and become president after Harrison’s death (rather than John Tyler), how might U. S. history differ?Tyler quickly clashed with Clay’s Whigs, vetoing key legislation (national bank, land sales, tariffs). A Clay presidency likely would have enacted a proto-Republican agenda—tariffs, Homestead Act, federal banking control, infrastructure investment—that Lincoln’s later administration embraced. Clay, opposed to Texas annexation, might have avoided the Mexican-American War and the sectional conflicts it intensified. Without annexation, two free states would enter the union (Iowa, Wisconsin) without balancing slave states, potentially leading to a smoother Whig-to-Republican transition concerning slavery opposition. Alternatively, annexation and war could occur under a Clay successor. The Civil War probably still happens, but with altered political dynamics: the existing vast territory mainly north of the Missouri Compromise line would doom slavery’s expansion, potentially causing a Democrat split rather than Republican ascendance over slavery. Texas and California might remain independent, engaging in complex regional politics and international involvement. Secession might succeed or transform into a unification war akin to 19th-century Italy or Germany. On Australian gas prices, cutting gas taxes amid a 30% import drop doesn’t eliminate the need for prices to rise enough to cut consumption equivalently until additional supply emerges. While in a closed economy price cuts might have no effect, Australia is part of the global oil market, so lowering taxes helps Australian consumers reduce consumption less than the global average, shifting the burden internationally. Many misunderstand prices’ market-clearing function: prices balance supply and demand to avoid shortages or surpluses; it’s incorrect to view price hikes as purely corporate greed rather than responses to excess demand. For example, profitable companies raising prices reflect excess demand causing increased profits, not just greedy pricing. Inflation rate declines in 2024 stalled and reversed in 2025 amid policy missteps, perpetuating “greedflation” perceptions incorrectly. Regarding whether Trump could unilaterally switch the U. S. to Celsius, he could not; such a move would provoke Republican revolt and likely impeachment. In European far-right politics, parties labeled “far right” often descend institutionally from historically fascist parties, focusing strongly on anti-immigration agendas but may not be markedly more right-wing overall than other right-of-center parties. Many adopt pro-Russian foreign policies, which deviates from traditional right-wing stances. Giorgia Meloni’s party fits this pattern institutionally and is tough on immigration but differs in being pro-EU, pro-NATO, and anti-Putin. Her coalition partner Matteo Salvini’s Lega party, however, adopts pro-Russian positions. U. S. media struggles to accurately portray these nuances. On Twitter, many platform issues stem from Elon Musk’s super-user privileges and erratic personal conduct, not structural flaws. Musk is intelligent yet a poor Twitter community member—he rarely shares factual budget info, never shows uncertainty or admits mistakes, and promotes low-quality accounts. Meanwhile, many users with diverse politics maintain high epistemic standards: citing studies, expressing uncertainty, correcting errors, debating openly. Structural changes Musk made are positive in some respects, but his poor media behavior heavily impacts platform quality.